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Abstract
The credit on reduction theory goes back to the work of Lagrange,
Gauss, Hermite, Korkin, Zolotarev, and Minkowski. Modern reduction
theory is voluminous and includes the work of A. Lenstra, H. Lenstra and
L. Lovasz who created the well known LLL algorithm, and many other
researchers such as L. Babai and C. P. Schnorr who created significant
new variants of basis reduction algorithms. In this paper, we propose and
investigate the efficacy of new optimization techniques to be used along
with LLL algorithm. The techniques we have proposed are: i) hill climb-
ing (HC), ii) lattice diffusion-sub lattice fusion (LDSF), and iii) multistage
hybrid LDSF-HC. The first technique relies on the sensitivity of LLL to
permutations of the input basis B, and optimization ideas over the sym-
metric group Sm viewed as a metric space. The second technique relies
on partitioning the lattice into sublattices, performing basis reduction in
the partition sublattice blocks, fusing the sublattices, and repeating. We
also point out places where parallel computation can reduce run-times
achieving almost linear speedup. The multistage hybrid technique relies
on the lattice diffusion and sublattice fusion and hill climbing algorithms.
Keywords. Lattice bases, unimodular matrices, right permutations, LLL
algorithm, random walk distribution.
1 Prehistory
The development of lattice basis reduction began in 1773 by L. Lagrange [22], C.
F. Gauss [8], C. Hermite [16] (1850), A. Korkin and Y. R. Zolotarev [19] (1873),
H. Minkowski[24] (1896), and B. L. van der Waerden [34] (1956) . The Her-
mite, Korkin, Zolotarev (HKZ [12]) lattice basis reduction method is assumed
to be the strongest but impractical reduction approach. In 1982, Arjen Lenstra,
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Hendrik Lenstra and La´szlo´ Lova´sz [23], introduced a polynomial time basis re-
duction algorithm to factor a rational polynomial, presently known as LLL, that
approximates the shortest vector within a factor of 2n/2, where n is the rank of
the lattice. Thus, LLL is fast but weak due to the large approximation factor.
In 1986, L. Babai [3], proposed an algorithm that approximates the closest vec-
tor to a lattice point by a factor of
(
3√
2
)n
. In 1987, C. P. Schnorr [29] proposed
a further refinement of the LLL algorithm that improved the shortest vector
approximation factor to (1 + )n. The Block Korkin Zolotarev (BKZ) algorithm
was introduced and studied [3, 30] by Babai and Schnorr respectively. In 1993,
M. Seysen [27] showed that each full rank n lattice L has a basis B and an
associated basis B∗ of the reciprocal lattice L∗, with S(B) ≤ exp(c2 · (lnn)2),
where S(B) = max1≤i≤n(‖bi‖ · ‖b∗i ‖) and c2 independent of n. This was an
improvement on the relation S(B) ≤ exp(c1 · n1/3) established by J. Hastard
and J. C. Lagarias [15]. In 1994, Schnorr and Euchner [31] introduced improved
algorithms for BKZ and deep insertion, but the runtime of these algorithms is
not polynomial.
In 2001, M. Ajtai et al., [2] introduced a Sieve algorithm for the shortest
lattice vector problem. In Eurocrypt 2008, N. Gama and P. Nguyen [13] ob-
served experimentally that BKZ’s practical runtime seems to grow exponentially
with lattice dimension. In 2010, O. Dagdelen and M. Schneider, [7] presented
a parallel version of the lattice enumeration algorithm using a multi-core CPU
system.
The shortest vector (SVP) and closest vector (CVP) problems, presently con-
sidered intractable, are algorithmic tasks that lie at the core of many number
theoretic problems, integer programming, finding irreducible factors of polyno-
mials, minimal polynomials of algebraic numbers, and simultaneous Diophantine
approximation. Lattice basis reduction also has deep and extensive connections
with modern cryptography, and cryptanalysis particularly in the post-quantum
era. At present, lattice based cryptosystem do not appear to be vulnerable to
quantum attacks. Also, the implementation of a lattice based cryptosystem is
faster than the RSA or ECC system at an equivalent security level which is
proposed in papers by T. Gu¨neysu et.al. in 2012, [14] and by J. Howe in 2015,
[18]. In 1982, A. Shamir [32] proposed a polynomial-time algorithm for break-
ing the basic Merkle-Hellman cryptosystem. In 1985, J. C. Lagarias and A. M.
Odlyzko, [20] solved low density knapsack problems. In 1996, Hoffstein et al.,
[17] proposed NTRU: a ring theory based public key cryptosystem. In 1997, D.
Coppersmith [5] published a paper on small solutions to polynomial equations,
and low exponent RSA vulnerabilities. In this paper, Coppersmith showed how
to find small integer solutions to a modular polynomial in a single variable and
extended the method to the multivariate case. In 1997, M. Ajtai and C. Dwork
[1] designed a probabilistic public key cryptosystem whose security relies on the
hardness of lattice problems. Their cryptosystem is quite impractical because
of the massive data expansion, as it encrypts data bit-by-bit.
Inspired by the Ajtai-Dwork cryptosystem, O. Goldreich et. al., [11] pro-
posed a public key cryptosystem based on the closest vector problem in a lattice,
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and J.-Y. Cai and T. W. Cusick, [4] introduced similar work on a lattice based
public key cryptosystem in 1999. In 2001, C. Gentry, [9] published a paper on
Key Recovery and Message Attacks on NTRU-Composite, where he recovers
information about the private key used in NTRU. In 2001, D. Coppersmith
and A. Shamir, [6] proposed a new lattice basis reduction technique to crypt-
analyze the NTRU scheme. In 2009, Craig Gentry, [10], in his Ph.D. thesis,
described a fully homomorphic encryption scheme based on ideal lattices. Cur-
rently, there are many mathematicians vigorously contributing to lattice basis
reduction theory, and improving best lattice bounds.
2 Preliminaries
A lattice L ⊂ Rn, generated bym linearly independent vectorsB = {b1, b2, ..., bm≤n}
in Rn, is the set of all integral linear combinations of the vectors of B.
L = 〈B〉Z = {a1b1 + a2b2 + · · ·+ ambm : ai ∈ Z}.
Here, B is called a basis for L, and m the rank or dimension of L. For any
two bases B and C of the lattice L, there is a unimodular matrix U such that
B = UC.
2.1 Geometry of numbers
Let L be a rank-m lattice in n-dimensional Euclidean space Rn. The first
minimum of the lattice, denoted λ1(L), is the length of a shortest nonzero
vector v1 ∈ L. The second minimum of the lattice, denoted by λ2(L), is the
smallest real number r such that there exist two R-linearly independent lattice
vectors v1 and v2 such that ‖v1‖, ‖v2‖ ≤ r. In general, for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, the ith
successive minimum of the lattice, denoted λi(L), is the smallest real number r
such that there exist “i” R-linearly independent vectors v1, v2, . . . , vi ∈ L such
that ‖v1‖, ‖v2‖, . . . , ‖vi‖ ≤ r.
2.2 Permutations and groups
The symmetric group on X = {1, 2, . . . , n} is the collection of all n! permuta-
tions of the symbols of X, denoted by Sn. Sn forms a group under the usual
composition of functions. If pi ∈ Sn, one of several ways of representing pi is as a
two rows matrix of the form pi = ( 1 2 ··· npi(1) pi(2) ··· pi(n) ), exhibiting the bijection.
The Cartesian form of pi is simply the vector of images [pi(1), pi(2), . . . , pi(n)].
The symmetric group Sn can be made into a metric space by defining the dis-
tance between two permutations x, y ∈ Sn as the number of places the Cartesian
forms of x and y differ. Given a permutation pi ∈ Sn we associate with pi an
n × n matrix A = (ai,j), where ai,j = 1 if pi(i) = j and ai,j = 0 otherwise.
Such a matrix A is called a permutation matrix. This is a matrix obtained from
the identity matrix In by permuting its columns by pi. We denote a single LLL
operation on a permuted basis Bpi by Λ(Bpi).
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We define the radius of a permutation as its Hamming distance from the identity
permutation. A permutation pir of radius r in the symmetric group Sn is said
to be a left permutation if r ≤ n2 , otherwise, it is a right permutation.
3 Sensitivity of LLL under basis permutations
A repeated application of LLL on the same ordered basis B yields identical
output. Consider a case where a single LLL algorithm can not completely
reduce a lattice basis B. If we apply LLL lattice basis reduction after randomly
(or systematically) reordering the original basis B, it will almost always yield a
different basis.
Consider a basis M54, an ideal lattice of rank 54, taken from the ideal lattice
challange [26]. The length of the shortest vector (l) after LLL on those lattice
bases are given as
l = 2745.73.
For each radius r ∈ {5, 10, . . . , 50}, we select a random sample of N = 100
permutations and compute Λ(Bpii) for 1 ≤ i ≤ 100. This yields a 100 × 1
table (1) of length of the shortest vector. Then we record the minimum value,
maximum value, mean (µ) and the standard deviation (σ) of this table.
radius min max µ σ range
05 1946.87 2512.98 2241.26 115.51 566.11
10 1968.17 2535.28 2256.89 102.84 567.11
15 1946.77 2532.94 2256.88 122.84 586.17
20 1946.87 2521.33 2282.65 95.86 574.46
25 1946.87 2469.95 2264.28 96.69 523.08
30 1968.17 2473.17 2263.23 101.65 505.00
35 1968.17 2558.02 2271.41 125.97 589.85
40 1946.77 2493.44 2254.79 115.24 546.67
45 1968.17 2552.18 2284.52 109.11 584.01
50 2010.59 2490.98 2260.74 100.35 480.39
Table 1: LLL reduction over permuted basis
3.1 Effectiveness of right permutation
Let B be a lattice basis. Then, Λ(B), Λ2(B), . . . ,Λn(B) are identical, that
is Λ is an idempotent operator. However, table (1) shows that the LLL algo-
rithm is sensitive to permutations of the basis. Based on these observations,
we analyze the basis reduction pattern when basis rows are permuted. In the
experiments below, we take a basis B of an ideal lattice of rank 52 from the
Hall of Fame website [26] and reduce it by the LLL algorithm. Let B∗ = Λ(B).
B∗ is not of high quality and requires further reduction. We proceed as fol-
lows: for each possible radius r ∈ {2, 3, . . . , 52}, we select a random sample
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Sr = {pir,1, . . . , pir,N} of N permutations, where N ∈ {100, 500}. We compute
Λ(B∗pi) for all pi ∈ S =
52⋃
r=2
Sr, and observe how often a basis gets reduced for
each sample. The output parameters l, L, and log(wt) are the resulting lengths
of the shortest vector, longest vector, and the log10 of the weight of the
reduced basis. In the graph below, we use the following notation.
llb← lmin, lub← Lmin, and mwt← min(log10 wt)
where min represents the minimum of all sample for each radius.
The relative frequency 0.6 corresponding to the radius r in the graph below
represents that the basis gets further reduced 60% of the time if we rearrange the
LLL reduced basis with a permutation of radius r. From above graphs, larger
the permutation radius, larger the relative frequency for the shortest vector.
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Next, we compute the averages for l, L, log10 wt over the 500 permutations
for each radius r ∈ {2, 3, . . . , 52} and analyze the pattern of these averages
versus the radius.
Further, we normalize the average values by using the transformation
normalized value =
value - minimum value
maximum value - minimum value
The normalized average values 0 and 1 corresponding to the radii r1 and r2
represent the least and the greatest average among all experiments occurred
under permutations of radii r1 and r2 respectively.
Figure 1: Normalized average vs radius
In above experiments, the decreasing pattern of the curve corresponding to
the shortest vector, makes clear that in average, the shortest vector length is
achieved more efficiently if the radius of the permutation is larger. This means
that the length of the shortest vector is effectively reduced by an application of
permutations of right radii. This is true for number of experiments we have
performed on lattice bases of different dimensions. Regarding those factors, we
have proposed the hill climbing lattice basis reduction technique below.
4 Hill Climbing Lattice Basis Reduction
Hill climbing reduction is an optimization technique that attempts to search for a
better solution locally and repeat the procedure until it finds a prescribed global
solution. In our research, this method takes an advantage of the sensitivity of
LLL to permuting the input basis. There are two types of Hill climbing lattice
basis reduction techniques:
6
1. Reduction with a fixed radius (spherical random walk).
2. Reduction with variable radius (spiral random walk).
These two methods are easy to understand from the description of the algorithms
below. The second method differs from the first in the sense that the radii of
successive permutations samples are systematically increased from one step to
the next step, while radii are fixed in the first method.
4.1 Hill climbing lattice basis reduction algorithm
(Type I: Fixed radius )
Input: Basis B0 = {b1, b2, · · · , bm≤n} of L ⊂ Rn, and parameters: k, p.
Output: v ∈ L, where ‖v‖ ≤ m · (detL)1/m.
1. i← 1, Compute B1 = Λ(B0),
2. Select a random sample of k permutations of radius r, Si = {pii,1, . . . , pii,k} ⊂
Sm,
3. Compute {Λ(Bpii,ji ) : 1 ≤ j ≤ k}, and select j such that Λ(Bpii,ji ) achieves
best reduction over the ith step sample Si,
4. Update: Bi+1 ← Λ(Bpii,ji ) and let i← i+ 1,
5. → 2 if (i ≤ p) and desired bound has not been achieved , else end.
(Type II: Variable radius )
Input: Basis B = {b1, b2, · · · , bm≤n} of L ⊂ Rn and r0, rstep, k, p,
parameters.
Output: v ∈ L, where ‖v‖ ≤ m · (detL)1/m.
1. i← 1, r ← r0, Compute B1 = Λ(B0),
2. Select a random sample of k right permutations of radius r, S = {pii,1, . . . , pii,k} ⊂
Sm,
3. Compute {Λ(Bpii,ji ) : 1 ≤ j ≤ k}, and select j such that Λ(Bpii,ji ) achieves
best reduction over S,
4. Update: Bi+1 ← Λ(Bpii,ji ), r ← r + rstep, and let i← i+ 1,
5. → 2 if (i ≤ p) and desired bound has not been achieved, else end.
In tables below, we compare the length of the shortest vector by using the
hill climbing reduction approach on the ideal lattice of rank 68 and the ideal
lattice of rank 108. The value at HC-r represents the length of the shortest
vector due to the hill climbing algorithm of radius r in the corresponding stage.
The value at HC-PSL2 represents the length of the shortest vector due to the
hill climbing algorithm using PSL2 group elements. The LLL-RR (arbitrary
7
precision floating point) version of LLL algorithm from the NTL library is used
to reduce the lattice basis. The sample size taken in each step is 100.
Initially, the length of the shortest vector obtained for the lattice of rank 68
after an application of the LLL-RR algorithm with reduction parameter α = 0.9
was 4664. The shortest vector in the experiment in the table below corresponds
to the reduction parameter α = 0.9999. We have compared the hill climbing
reduction with different radii using the same parameter α = 0.9999. The length
of the shortest vector was 2222 that corresponds to BKZ-10.
Step LLL BKZ-10 HC-30 HC-42 HC-48 HC-54 HC-66 HC-PSL2
1 2890 2222 2172 2218 2172 2189 2154 2255
5 – – 2152 2172 2172 2172 2141 2182
Table 2: Comparison for an ideal lattice of rank 68
Next, the length of the shortest vector obtained for the lattice of rank 108
after the application of the LLL-RR algorithm with reduction parameter α =
0.9 was 12,308. Since the shortest vector corresponds to the LLL paramerer
α = 0.99999, we compare the hill climbing reduction with different radii with
the same parameter α = 0.99999.
Step LLL BKZ-35 HC-50 HC-60 HC-70 HC-80 HC-100 HC-PSL2
1 6275 4616 4258 4129 4309 3835 4202 4513
4 – – 4015 3938 4010 3835 4104 4337
7 – – 4015 3880 4010 3835 4006 4064
Table 3: Comparison for an ideal lattice of rank 108
From above tables, we observe that the hill climbing algorithm with any
radius produces smaller l values than the LLL or BKZ algorithms. Among all
values, HC-66 in table (4.1) and HC-80 in table (4.1) have better approximations
for the shortest lattice vectors.
In the next section we observe the hill climbing lattice basis reduction ap-
proach based on the radius of permutations. We observed a number of exper-
imental results of lattice basis reduction using our hill climbing approach on
bases each of which are already reduced by a single LLL operation. In this
section, we observe convergence patterns as follows:
(i) for the length of the shortest lattice vector at each hillstep versus radius.
(ii) average length and the shortest vectors at all hill steps versus radius.
(iii) average length and shortest length of all radii versus each hill step.
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For each step and each possible radius, we have taken a basis sample of 100
permutations. Based on our computations, we conclude that the run-time to
get the shortest lattice vector using hill climbing with variable radii is less than
the approach with fixed radius. Scatterplot with a smooth fitted lines of our
experiments are given below.
Figure 2: Minimal length vs radius
Figure 3: Average length and the shortest length vs radius
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Figure 4: Average length and the shortest length vs hill step
5 Lattice diffusion and sublattice fusion
Sending a basis to parallel nodes is not a good idea for a lattice basis that
requires long runtime. Instead, we “diffuse” the given input basis into smaller
blocks (not necessarily disjoint) and send these blocks to the nodes of a parallel
server machines with proper instructions. This method not only reduces the
runtime but also reduces the value of the largest entries in the basis. As we
get the output back from the server machines to the master client machine,
we combine them and rearrange the basis vectors with a right permutation.
Then, we again diffuse the basis gradually increasing the block size. The process
continues until a desired bound it obtained. Using this approach, we successfully
achieved the lattice vectors whose estimated euclidean norm were less than the
given bound on the Lattice hall of fame [26].
5.1 Lattice diffusion and sublattice fusion algorithm (LDSF)
Input: Basis B of L ⊂ Rn, β : Block Size, and N, M : parameters.
Output: A lattice vector of “minimal” length close to b.
1. m← number of rows in B  l← 1.
2. i← 1.
3. For j = 1 to k; k is the number of server.
4. Bj ← a block matrix taking randomly β rows from B.
5. Send Bj to server j  Bˆj ← result from server j.
6. Bi ← (∪Bˆj)pi  go to step 3 if M ≤ i← i+ 1.
7. b∗ ←
M
min
i=1
{min ||bi|| : bi ∈ Bi}.
8. End if b∗ ≤ b.
9. Go to the step 2 if (N ≥ l← l + 1) ∧ (1 ≤ k ← k − 1).
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Figure 5: LDSF algorithm
We presently consider a second operator which we denote by C = Σ(m,n,B)
which consists of (i) applying a sample of n permutations pi1, pi2, . . . , pin to the
input base B, (ii) computing Ci = LDSF (m,B
pii), for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and (iii)
letting C be the best basis among the resulting Ci.
Figure 6: Operator Σ(m,n,B)
If the time required to reduce a basis is very large, we use our multistage
lattice diffusion and sublattice fusion technique until we get significant changes
of the basis entries. In fact, combination of lattice diffusion sublattice fusion
algorithm with the hill climbing algorithm improves a lattice basis. An expla-
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nation of multistage lattice diffusion and sublattice fusion plus a hill climbing
algorithm is given below:
5.2 A 4-stage hybrid LDSF-HC process
In the first stage, given an initial basis B0, which is not reducible by LLL, we
compute LDSF (m,B0) by breakingB0 intom blocks of sub-basesB0,1, B0,2, . . . , B0,m,
and applying the LLL-RR algorithm to eachB0,i, to obtain Λ(B0,1), . . . ,Λ(B0,m).
We then fuse the Λ(B0,i) to obtain basis B1 of L. This step helps to reduce
the absolute value of the lattice basis entries. In the second stage, we ob-
tain a random sample of n right permutations pi1, . . . , pin and compute bases
Cj = LDSF (m,B
pij
1 ), for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Next, we select the best basis among
the {Cj}nj=1 and call it B2. The operations performed in stage 2 can be suc-
cinctly denoted by B2 = Σ(m,n,B1). Stage 3 is simply B3 = Σ(l, n,B2) where
l < m. Finally there is a termination stage computing the basis B4 = Λ(B3).
Schematically,
Figure 7: 4-stage hybrid LDSF-HC
If the lattice basis is not sufficiently reduced to use LLL in the 3rd stage, we
add additional stages like stage 3 hoping for a better reduction. For example,
in the experiments below, we use a 5-stage and 6-stage models.
In the experiments below, we compare our lattice diffusion and sublattice
fusion algorithm with the fastest floating point version of LLL lattice reduction
algorithm (LLL-FP) available in the NTL library with the parameter α = 0.9.
5.3 Experiment
The initial information is an ideal lattice of rank 300 obtained from [26].
i) The length of each basis vectors is ≈ 10900.
ii) The initial time to reduce the lattice basis with our device of 24 GB/3GHz i7
processor using the NTL version of LLL-RR, with reduction parameter α = 0.9,
is approximately a week.
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Stage # Sample #Blocks llb lub Runtime
1 1 3 19324936602 8659772341291 1hr 1 m
2 10 6 4509832663 62270235928 3 m 29 sec
3 5 3 2799147462 81977150923 33 m 51 sec
4 5 2 397155 1249483 53 m 40 sec
5 5 2 140973 236873 1 hr 6 m
Table 4: Reduction on an ideal lattice basis of order 300
Conclusion: In above experiment, the length of a shortest vector reduced
from ≈ 10900 to 140973.
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